

VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF  
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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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DATE: 21 Apr 70

TO: DCI ✓  
DDCI ✓  
FROM: GACarver, Jr. *le*

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

Attached for your information is a copy  
of a memo that took shape in my head  
this morning and was refined over a  
lunchtime discussion with Messrs.

I have sent it to  
Mr. Karamessines for whatever value or  
use it might have for him.

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Possible Actions to Assist the Cambodian Government

1. At the present time, the Cambodian Government -- i. e., Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Yem Sambaur and their senior associates -- are in urgent need of four things:

- a. Moral support;
- b. Political, military and propaganda advice;
- c. A small amount of tangible material assistance;
- d. An easing of Vietnamese Communist military

pressures.

2. In the area of moral support, <sup>the</sup> Cambodian leadership needs some assurance that it is not alone and friendless in an alien, hostile world. In the field of advice, the Cambodians' current actions show clearly that they require counsel on a variety of topics. Their army is clearly not fighting well, they are concerning themselves with internal political matters (e. g., abolition of the monarchy) which should not be addressed in the present crisis period, and their whole political and propaganda play of their hand -- particularly excesses committed against Vietnamese civilians -- is giving them a black eye instead of the sympathy they deserve and probably could garner if they were more

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politically sophisticated and astute in the presentation of their case to the press corps and the world at large.

3. Various steps suggest themselves for consideration in meeting Cambodia's needs in these two areas:

- a. A public statement by the President or some senior US official making it clear that the US Government would welcome nothing more than a truly neutral Cambodia but cannot remain indifferent when a peaceful state that has given offense to no one is blatantly invaded by troops of a foreign power.
- b. Consideration might be given to sending a high level Presidential emissary on a fact finding mission to Phnom Penh to talk to the current Cambodian leadership. If this idea is followed, Dean Acheson would be an obvious candidate. He is a Democrat, has a lot of credit in Congress, is objective, and stands very high with the Cambodians since he successfully argued their case at the World Court in connection with their dispute with Thailand over possession of the temple at Preah Vihear.
- c. Consideration should also be given, whether or not an emissary is dispatched, to upgrading the US Mission in Phnom Penh and dispatching an Ambassador. One excellent

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(this is [ ] idea, not mine; but I think it is a good one). Other candidates whose names immediately suggest themselves are [ ] and Ambassador Henry L. T. Koren. [ ] now the

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[ ]  
[ ] Koren,

now POLAD at CINCPAC, was the DEPCORDS in I Corps.

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[ ]

4. A program of tangible assistance should be quickly but carefully worked out. Whatever is provided in the immediate future should be weighed for psychological or morale-lift value as well as actual need. On the other hand, we should be careful not to give the Cambodians more than they can absorb or effectively use. We should certainly not turn over large stores of sophisticated equipment that could easily fall into Communist hands and/or generate problems with Congress.

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5. Easing the military pressures on the Phnom Penh Government involves two things: improving its performance and giving the North Vietnamese pause, or at least other problems to worry about. In the latter area the moves open are fairly obvious. They include conveying the kind of covert threat this Agency is already trying to get across, deployment of US troops along the border, encouragement and support of South Vietnamese attacks against VC/NVA military forces in Cambodia, air and artillery harassment of Communist forces in Cambodia and -- finally -- the use of US ground troops.

6. Fairly solid evidence, including at least one COSVN document, strongly indicates that Hanoi and its senior commanders in South Vietnam have taken a quick look at the Cambodian situation and reached the firm, rather cynical judgment that the US is not going to do anything serious. The Communists seem to believe that we might offer Phnom Penh some moral and material support and perhaps a few advisors. The Communists have calculated, however, that we are not going to do much more than that and that we are probably not going to use US troops to give the VC/NVA forces a hard time on Cambodian soil. There is no chance of any significant easing of Communist military pressures against the Cambodian Government unless or until Hanoi revises these calculations.